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Abstract. Quite recently, distance-bounding protocols received a lot of
attention as they oer a good solution to thwart relay attacks. Their
security models at still unstable, especially when considering terrorist
fraud. This considers the case where a malicious prover would try to
bypass the protocol by colluding with an adversary without leaking his
credentials. Two formal models appeared recently: one due to Fischlin
and Onete and another one by Boureanu, Mitrokotsa, and Vaudenay.
Both were proposed with a provably secure distance-bounding protocols
(FO and SKI, respectively) providing security against all state-of-the-art
threat models. So far, these two protocols are the only such ones.
In this paper we compare both notions and protocols. We identify some
errors in the Fischlin-Onete results. We also show that the design of the
FO protocol lowers security against maa frauds while the SKI protocol
makes non-standard PRF assumptions and has lower security due to not
using post-authentication. None of these protocols provide reasonable
parameters to be used in practice with a good security. The next open
challenge consists in providing a protocol combining both approaches
and good practical parameters.
Finally, we provide a new security denition against terrorist frauds
which naturally inspires from the soundness notion for proof-of-knowledge
protocols.
1 Introduction
Relay attacks and distance-bounding. Many access control protocols are vul-
nerable to relay attacks. This is the case of most of RFID-based protocols. To
defeat this, distance-bounding protocols oer a practical solution. These pro-
tocols, originally proposed by Brands and Chaum [6], consist of proving that
a prover is within a close distance to a verier by using an interactive pro-
tocol. The protocol is based on the physical limits of communication. Namely,
transmission cannot go faster than the speed of light. So, these protocols use a
rapid-bit exchange phase in which the prover must respond extremely fast and
messages are very short (typically: single bits), in order to prove that he is close
enough.
Threat models. Clearly, distance-bounding shall resist to distance fraud, where
a malicious prover tries to defeat the protocol by passing even though he is far
away. They shall also defeat relay attacks and more general notions of man-
in-the-middle attacks where an adversary abuse of a far-away prover to pass
the protocol. This is what makes practitioners like distance-bounding protocols.
These types of attacks are often refer to as maa frauds, following a (quite
unfortunate) terminology due to Desmedt [9]. A more subtle notion from [9]
consists of the terrorist fraud. There, the prover is also malicious, but still far
away. He is colluding with an adversary (who can be close to the verier) to pass
the protocol, but without leaking his credentials to him. As discussed below, this
type of attack is very tricky, not always considered, and quite often incorrectly
addressed.
Many protocols and (informal) security notions have been proposed. Some
protocols have been semi-formally proven secure but most of results were shown
to be incorrect. For instance, some protocols based on a pseudorandom function
(PRF) were incorrectly proven secure, as shown in [2]. Consequently, and as far
as we know, none existing protocols (except the two which are discussed in this
paper) are proven to provide security against all the above threat models. We
refer the reader to [5] for a selective survey on the evolution of protocols which
has led to the current models and schemes.
There also exist some \more exotic" threat models such as distance hijack-
ing [8] where a far away malicious prover abuses other provers to pass the pro-
tocol with the verier.
The Problem of Terrorist Fraud. Originally, \terrorist fraud" [9] consisted in
having a malicious prover helping an adversary to impersonate him but without
leaking his credentials. To safeguard against this type of attack means that a
malicious prover cannot help an adversary to impersonate him without making
this help reusable. Namely, there must be no other way than transferring the
credentials to a close participant in order to make the protocol succeed.
The Hancke-Kuhn protocol: a Case Study. To illustrate this notion, we rst
give the example of a prominent distance-bounding protocol: the Hancke-Kuhn
protocol [14]. The prover and the verier share a long-term secret x. (See Fig. 1.)
They rst exchange some nonces. Then, a PRF f keyed with x is used to derive
some one-time n-bit keys a1 and a2. Then, they go through n rounds of rapid
bit-exchange: the verier sends a random challenge ci 2 f1; 2g and the prover
responds by the ith bit of aci . A terrorist fraud is easy: the malicious prover
helps the adversary to exchange the nonces then computes a1 and a2 and gives
them to the adversary. So, the adversary can successfully go through the rapid
bit-exchanges. Additionally, disclosing a1 and a2 does not expose x since we use
a secure PRF.
One diculty with resistance to terrorist fraud is that it is non-falsiable.
Indeed, we cannot falsify security just by exhibiting an attack. The attack must
be such that we could prove that the credentials do not leak, which is not always
easy to prove. (In the above example, this is based on the PRF assumption.)
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Verier Prover
secret: x secret: x
initialization phase
pick NV
NV          !
NP            pick NP
a1ka2 = fx(NP ; NV ) a1ka2 = fx(NP ; NV )
distance bounding phase
for i = 1 to n
pick ci 2 f1; 2g
start timeri
ci          !
stop timeri
ri            ri =

a1;i if ci = 1
a2;i if ci = 2
#fi : ri and timeri correctg   OutV          !
Fig. 1. The Hancke-Kuhn Distance-Bounding protocol [14]
A common technique to strengthen the Hancke-Kuhn protocol consists of us-
ing a2 = a1x. This way, the prover cannot disclose a1 and a2 without exposing
x. Unfortunately, it becomes vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack [15] in
which the man-in-the-middle ips one challenge ci and sends ci to the prover. So,
he can learn the ith bit from aci from the prover and deduce from the protocol
outcome the ith bit of aci . To avoid this attack, Kim et al. [15] proposed the
Swiss-Knife protocol, in which the protocol transcript is authenticated before
the protocol outcome is revealed. (See Fig. 2.)
Terrorist Fraud using resilience to noise. Unfortunately, this does not protect
against terrorist fraud as soon as noisy channels are considered. Indeed, the rapid
bit-exchange must be done under heavy constraints and it is likely that noise will
corrupt a few rounds in honest executions. So, protocols must tolerate a constant
number of incorrect rounds. In the protocols, we assume that authentication
succeeds when the number of successful rounds is at least  out of n. In practice,

n must be a constant ratio depending on physical constraints.
It was observed by Hancke [13] that a malicious prover could still provide
some noisy versions of a1 and a2 so that the number of succeeding rounds is
likely to be at least  (due to noise resilience) but a1  a2 would only leak a
noisy version of x. Concretely, we can imagine a function g mapping x to a small
(but constant-sized) set of indices g(x) and that a1 and a2 would be random at
all positions specied in g(x). So, the number of possible x is exponential and x
does not leak. Without the noiseless version of x, we cannot evaluate the PRF.
So, the credential does not leak.
Related work. Avoine et al. [1] give a complete but very informal security model
for distance-bounding. A more promising model is the one due to Durholz et
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Verier Prover
secret: x secret: x
initialization phase
pick NV
NV          !
NP            pick NP
a1 = fx(NP ; NV ) a1 = fx(NP ; NV )
a2 = a1  x a2 = a1  x
distance bounding phase
for i = 1 to n
pick ci 2 f1; 2g
start timeri
ci          !
stop timeri
ri            ri =

a1;i if ci = 1
a2;i if ci = 2
verication phase
#fi : ri and timeri correctg   t            t = fx(transcript)
check t
OutV          !
Fig. 2. The Swiss-Knife Distance-Bounding protocol [15]
al. [10]. It separates the use of rapid-bit exchange and regular communication and
is based on communication traces in the rapid exchange phase. They propose the
notion of SimTF security to model resistance to terrorist frauds. Unfortunately,
they show that essentially no existing protocol satises this notion and suspect
in [11] that this notion may be too demanding. In [12], they nally provide a
protocol (called the FO protocol in this paper) providing this security notion and
all the above ones. In parallel, Boureanu et al. [3,4,5] propose another model
which introduces the notion of location and communication time. They also
propose to model resistance to terrorist frauds, but with a notion called collusion
fraud. Additionally, they construct a family of protocols (the SKI protocols)
which oer provable security against all the above security notions.
Our results. In this paper, we identify some errors from [12]. Namely, the modi-
ed SwissKnife (MSK) protocol does not satisfy the security which is proven in
[12] and some probability parameters in the FO protocol are too low.
Then, we compare the FO and SKI protocols. We show that FO has a non-
uniform security against distance frauds. We show that the SimTF notion that
the FO protocol must satisfy degrades resistance to maa frauds. Consequently,
the number of rounds must be very high to obtain a good security. E.g., 163
rounds are needed for a security level equivalent to a 20-bit symmetric key.
With SKI, this is the same for distance fraud (but with a uniform security), this
is worse for collusion fraud (with 531 rounds), but the security against man-
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in-the-middle (what we like distance-bounding for) only requires 76 rounds. All
this holds for =n = 90%.
Finally, we compare the security notions to protect against terrorist frauds.
We also propose a new one which is naturally inspired from the notion of sound-
ness in proofs-of-knowledge: a distance-bounding protocol is sound if there is an
extractor who can extract the secret from the view of close participants by having
the protocol successfully executed. We prove that SKI satises this notion and
prove again strSimTF security for the FO protocol with corrected parameters.
Notations. In what follows, we will use B dened by
B(n; ; q) =
nX
i=
n
i

qi(1  q)n i (1)
It is known [7] that for  = nt, t and q constant such that t > q, and n! +1,
we have
B(n; ; q)  1p
2
Z +1
(t q)p n
q(1 q)
e 
x2
2 dx  1p
2
s
q(1  q)
n(t  q)2 e
 n(t q)2
2q(1 q)
So, we have the following result.
Lemma 1. For t and q constant such that t > q, we have
lim
n!+1 
1
n
lnB(n; nt; q) =
(t  q)2
2q(1  q)
2 The Fischlin-Onete Approach
2.1 SimTF Security
In [10], Durholz et al. propose a way to formalize the security against terrorist
fraud. It is referred to as the SimTF security in [12]. This model tells apart
communications through a lazy (regular) channel from the ones through a time-
critical channel. There is a special notion of tainted session which depends on
the security notion.
Denition 2 (SimTF security). We consider two experiments. In the rst
one, the malicious prover P  and the adversary A interact with the verier V .
A rapid exchange between V and A is tainted if we can make a sequence of
messages mV A;mAP ;mPA;mAV in chronological order such that mUV is sent
from U then received by V . We denote by pA the probability that the verier ac-
cepts in this rst experiment. In the second experiment, we rst run the previous
experiment, then provide a simulator S with the nal view of A. S then interacts
alone with V in a new session. We denote by pS the probability that the verier
accepts in this last session.
We say that a terrorist fraud (A;P ) is successful if for all S we have pS 
pA.
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So, P  and A are not allowed to interact during the rapid exchange between V
and A. In [11], it was shown that essentially none of the existing protocols oers
SimTF security, but it was suggested that this could be due to the notion being
too strong.
This notion was strengthened even more in [12] by changing the notion of
tainted session. In this strengthened notion, P  and A can interact during the
distance bounding phase, but they are not allowed to have any single round
(instead of the session) of rapid bit-exchange which goes through the V -A-P -
A-V loop. This is the strSimTF notion.
2.2 GameTF Security
In [12], Fischlin and Onete proposed a weaker notion.
Denition 3 (GameTF security). Let AdvMF be the best probability that a ver-
ier accepts in a maa-fraud attack. (The maximum is taken over all adversaries
with limited complexity and number of queries to P and V .)
A terrorist fraud (P ; A) is helpful to an adversary A0 if running an ex-
periment with V , A, and P  and no tainted session, then running a second
experiment with V , A0, and P , with A0 initialized with the nal view of A and
no tainted session, makes V accept with a probability PA0 which is larger than
AdvMF. (The complexity bounds of AdvMF must be satised by A0.) We use the
notion of tainted session from strSimTF.
We have "-GameTF security if all terrorist fraud (P ; A) succeeding with
pA  " are helpful for at least one adversary A0.
Remark 4. The probability AdvMF of the best maa-fraud attack is not a well-
dened quantity if we do not impose an exact limitation on the adversary (e.g.
in terms of complexity and number of queries). Indeed, if we consider all poly-
nomially bounded adversaries, for each value of the security parameter, there is
always a polynomially bounded attack (namely, the one making an exhaustive
search up to this value of the security parameter and doing nothing beyond)
succeeding with probability close to 1.
Remark 5. For every maa-fraud adversary A, it is always possible to design
another adversary A0 with a small complexity overhead and doing a bit better: we
assume that A makes enough observations. We dene A0 by rst making a guess
for the secret. Then, A0 simulates A. If, during the observations, A0 realizes that
the guess for the secret is consistent with the information collected by A, then
it stops simulating A and uses the guess to impersonate the prover. Otherwise,
the simulation continues normally. By tuning the number of observations so
that the probability that an incorrect guess is consistent is negligible against the
probability to guess the secret correctly, this new adversary A0 performs better
and A.
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In [12], Fischlin and Onete modify the Swiss-Knife protocol to make it Ga-
meTF-secure. The protocol is on Fig. 3.1 We call it the MSK protocol (as for
Modied Swiss-Knife). Essentially, they introduce a new shared secret y: x is
only used for the PRF computation while y is used in a2 = a1  y. This pro-
tocol is GameTF-secure for " = AdvMF [12, Prop.1]. It is further claimed that
AdvMF = B(n; ; 12 ) + negl for a targeted reader session
2 where B is dened by
Eq.(1).
Verier Prover
secret: x; y secret: x; y
initialization phase
pick NV
NV          !
NP            pick NP
a1 = fx(NP ; NV ) a1 = fx(NP ; NV )
a2 = a1  y a2 = a1  y
distance bounding phase
for i = 1 to n
pick ci 2 f1; 2g
start timeri
ci          !
stop timeri
ri            ri =

a1;i if ci = 1
a2;i if ci = 2
verication phase
#fi : ri and timeri correctg   t            t = fx(transcript)
check t
OutV          !
Fig. 3. The Modied Swiss-Knife (MSK) Distance-Bounding protocol [11]
Introducing a new secret y besides the one x used in PRF is a clever choice
to avoid the problems based on PRF programming [2] making security results
incorrect. We still need to have y honestly selected (as specied in [12]) for
distance fraud. Otherwise, registering y = 0 leads to a trivial distance fraud.
1 For the sake of clarity in this paper, our description slightly diers from the one in
[12]. The main dierence resides in that [12] uses two separate counters to count the
number of rounds for which the timer expires, and for which the timer is acceptable
but the response is incorrect. Our analysis remains valid for the original version in
[12].
2 We can infer this bound from [12, Prop.3] which applies to the original protocol. In
this result, the rst term of AdvMF is qR2
  where qR is the number of (untargeted)
adversary-reader sessions, other terms being negligible as they express that nonces
may repeat or that the PRF property may be defeated.
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Terrorist fraud against the MSK protocol. We now show a practical terrorist
fraud contradicting the security proof for GameTF-security from [12]. We con-
sider a malicious prover helping the adversary in the nonce exchange and the
nal transcript authentication, and just disclosing a1 and y to the adversary.
Clearly, the adversary using a1 and a2 = a1  y succeeds with probability 1.
We have now to show that this adversary is not helpful in practice. He only
discloses y. The (a1; a2) pairs can be learnt by running the protocol with the
honest prover. So, we just have to consider a maa fraud adversary getting y as
an auxiliary input. We can show (see the Lemma below) that such an adversary
is incapable of succeeding, except with negligible probability. So, it is clear that
we do have a terrorist fraud succeeding with probability 1 and leaking no useful
information to mount a maa fraud attack.
Lemma 6. In the MSK protocol, we consider an experiment with a far-away
prover P , an adversary A receiving y as an auxiliary input, and a verier V .
The probability that a target session of V accepts is limited by B(n; ; 12 ) + negl.
Proof. We rst reduce to cases where nonces do not repeat and the PRF is
replaced by a random function. Then, using hybrids, we reduce to a single session
on P and V using the same nonces. Finally, we assume that if P and V see
dierent transcripts, the protocol fails due to an incorrect t. All this induces a
negligible term in the probability of success.
Due to the large distance between P and V , A can either send a random
c0i to P before he receives ci from V (the Go-Early strategy), or answers to ci
without any clue and ask for some c0i to P later (the Go-Late strategy).
Since A knows y, in the Go-Early strategy, A deduces the answer to all
possible challenge ci at round i. However, the correct tag t can only be obtained
from P if ci = c
0
i, which happens with probability
1
2 .
In the Go-Late strategy, A has no clue about the response, so the probability
to be correct is 12 .
Hence, in any case, the probability that one round is correct is 12 . Since we
need  correct rounds, the probability to win is B(n; ; 12 ). ut
It was proven in [12, Prop.1] that the MSK protocol is GameTF-secure. How-
ever, the proof makes no reference to the authenticating t in the protocol, which
makes us believe that the result is incorrect. The above attack shows that either
this is the case, or the GameTF security does not capture well the resistance to
terrorist fraud. Indeed, it could be the case that a helpful attack is still rele-
vant in practice, although ruled out by this notion, because the help provided is
negligible.
2.3 FO: A SimTF-Secure Protocol
In [12], Fischlin and Onete propose another protocol which is SimTF and str-
SimTF-secure. The protocol is on Fig. 4.3 We call it the FO protocol. In a normal
3 Like for the MSK protocol, the original FO protocol uses two separate counters. Our
analysis for the original protocol will be discussed in Remark 7.
8
execution, we always have b = 0 and the protocol works like the one on Fig. 3.
For b = 1, a special procedure is run: the accepted response ri is dierent, and
the verication for I is a bit special. Namely, the verier now accepts ri = ci as
the correct answer.4 For b = 0, the verier checks that I 0 = I. Additionally, for
b = 1, I is accepted with a probability pdH(I;y) which depends on the Hamming
distance between I and y. The value of pd is adjusted to have SimTF security.
So, the maa fraud resistance corresponds to the terrorist fraud resistance. The
idea is that the b = 0 case protects against distance frauds and maa frauds,
and that terrorist frauds leak some information y0 close to y, and the b = 1 case
protects against distance frauds only but requires such information y0.
Verier Prover
secret: x; y secret: x; y
initialization phase
pick NV
NV          ! set b = 0
b;I;NP            pick NP
I 0ka1 = fx(NP ; NV ) Ika1 = fx(NP ; NV )
a2 = a1  y a2 = a1  y
distance bounding phase
for i = 1 to n
pick ci 2 f1; 2g
start timeri
ci          !
stop timeri
ri            ri =

a1;i if ci = 1
a2;i if ci = 2
verication phase
check b; I; t;
t            t = fx(transcript)
#fi : ri and timeri correctg   OutV          !
correctness conditions for b = 0 correctness conditions for b = 1
I 0 = I correct with probability pdH (I;y)
t = fx(transcript) |
ri = aci;i ri = ci
timeri  B timeri  B
Fig. 4. The Fischlin-Onete Distance-Bounding protocol [12]
4 In [12], it is written that the verier also accepts ri = ci which seems to mean that
both ri = (aci)i and ri = ci are accepted. However, having two dierent possible
responses could lead to an easy distance fraud: if for some value of ci both answers
are correct, we just prepare the answer for the other value ci. So, only the ri = ci
answer should be accepted.
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We rst note that it is pretty weird to have a piece of code (namely, the
b = 1 case) which shall never be used for b = 1, and which provides an escape
way to pass the protocol without knowing x. It may also introduce some strange
attack models similar to distance hijacking [8], where far-away malicious provers
take advantage of the proximity of honest participants to feed responses for
them. Here, a far-away prover only needs someone to echo the challenges. We
could also have a malicious participant P 1 (x) carrying the initialization and
verication phases himself, and hijacking some (P 2 (x); A(x)) pair running a
terrorist fraud with b = 1. So, this protocol modication may induce some new
\exotic" kinds of frauds in the family of distance fraud and distance hijacking.
Distance fraud. A malicious far-away prover could anticipate responses corre-
sponding to yi = 0 since they are independent of the challenge. Others are
correct with probability 12 . On average over the distribution of y, one round suc-
ceeds with probability 34 . With y xed, the probability of success of the distance
fraud is B(w;    n+w; 12 ) with B dened by Eq.(1), where w = dH(0; y) is the
Hamming weight of y. So, user receiving a key y with a low weight have a better
incentive to cheat in a distance fraud! It could also induce some weird behaviors
of malicious users asking for new credentials until they have a better Hamming
weight. Another bad property is that the probability of B(w;  n+w; 12 ) is xed
once for all: a user succeeding to get a low w oine has always better chances
to defeat distance fraud online. Clearly the security is non-uniform about the
selection of y. On average, it is of B(n; ; 34 ).
Maa fraud. Due to the design of the FO protocol, terrorist frauds induce maa
frauds. Let us consider the following terrorist fraud (A;P ) depending on a
parameter e: let g(x) be a set of indices of cardinality e. Then, we consider a
malicious prover P  disclosing y0 such that g(x) = fi; yi 6= y0ig and #g(x) = e.
Additionally, he helps the adversary A in the nonce exchange and provides a01
matching a1 on each position which is not in g(x) and set to random bits in
positions in g(x). The adversary using a01 and a
0
2 = a
0
1  y0 instead of a1 and
a2 wins if the number of errors is below n    . We know that errors happen
randomly in a set of e. So, the probability to pass is e = B(e; e   n + ; 12 ).
Now, for an adversary S trying to pass the protocol by only knowing y0, since
he cannot forge t in the verication phase, the best strategy is to use the escape
strategy with b = 1. Since he has no information about g(x), y0 remains the best
approximation of y to him. By using I = y0, he passes with probability pe. For
instance, for e = 2(n   ), we have e = 12 : it shall be enough to provide a y
with twice more errors than allowed. Due to the SimTF denition, this attacks
requires that we have pe  e for all e. In Th. 8, we will show that this condition
is also sucient.
However, the pe  e bounds creates a new maa fraud attack: Now, we
consider a maa-fraud adversary who just tries to guess y0 within a small distance
to y and who uses the escape b = 1 in the protocol with this guess. Trying to
guess vector at a distance e works with probability of success
 
n
e

2 n. Finally,
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the attack using b = 1 and a random I works with probability
p =
nX
e=0
n
e

2 npe

nX
e=0
n
e

2 ne
=
nX
e=0
n
e

2 nB

e; e  n+ ; 1
2

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nX
e=0
eX
i=e n+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e
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2 2n3n i
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nX
j=

n
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
3
4
j 
1
4
n j
= B

n; ;
3
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
with B dened by Eq.(1). In contrast, the probability of success of the regular
(i.e. with b = 0) maa fraud is B(n; ; 12 ) which is much lower. So, this modica-
tion of the Swiss-Knife protocol induces a signicant security loss for maa-fraud
resistance.
As an application, we take n   = n10 (that is, we want 90% of the rounds to
be correct to tolerate a noise level below 10%). For n = 144 rounds, we obtain
B(n; ; 12 )  2 80, but B
 
n; ; 34
  2 18. To reach B  n; ; 34  2 80, we need
n  724 to secure the FO protocol against the maa fraud. On Fig. 5, we plot
  log2B(n; ; p) for  = dn  0:9e and p 2 f 12 ; 34g. (Note that discontinuities are
due to rounding  .) Due to Lem. 1, it is clear that these curves are close to a line
with slope
( n p)2
2p(1 p) ln 2 . So, for the number of rounds n, we are loosing a factor
3
4


n  12

n  34
2
which is 163 in this case.
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The security of FO follows the curve 3 for distance fraud, maa fraud, and terrorist
fraud while the security of MSK follows the curve 1 for maa fraud. The security of
SKI follows the curves 3, 2, and 4 for distance fraud, man-in-the-middle, and collusion
fraud, respectively.
Fig. 5. Security (Equivalent Bitlength) in Terms of the Number of Rounds n for  =
dn  0:9e
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Note that this attack can self-improve: assuming that an adversary has got
a good y0, his probability of success in a maa fraud will always be at least
e. Furthermore, if this probability is low enough, by doing some statistics and
using a hill climbing approach, the adversary can nd a better y0 and eventually
obtain one within a distance n  , which makes the attack work with probability
1. Fortunately, except in a terrorist fraud case, there is no better way to nd a
good y0 than a random guess.
Another interesting observation is that we need n     n4 for security.
Indeed, for n    n4 , we have p  12 which makes the protocol insecure.
Remark 7. In [12], there are specic counters for the response errors and the
timer errors. Namely, there should be no more thanEmax errors and no more than
Tmax timeouts. Furthermore, it is specied that pd = min(1; 2
 d+Tmax+Emax). We
can adapt our strategy above by having the malicious prover to use two disjoin
sets g(x) and g0(x) and disclosing y0 with errors in g(x) and holes in g0(x). The
adversary would run for a time out for every hole and work as above otherwise.
For e = 2Emax, the probability of success is
1
2 . Now, to approximate y, we have
to ll the holes with random bits. So, we have a probability of success
TmaxX
i=0

Tmax
i

2 Tmaxpe+i =
TmaxX
i=0

Tmax
i

2 Tmax min(1; 2 e i+Tmax+Emax)
=
TmaxX
i=0

Tmax
i

2 Tmax min(1; 2 Emax i+Tmax)
=
TmaxX
i=0

Tmax
i

2 Emax i
=

1
2
Emax 3
2
Tmax
when Emax  Tmax. This is smaller than
 
3
4
Tmax
. Clearly, this is not larger than
1
2 , when Emax  Tmax  2. So, the probabilities pd provided in [12] are incorrect
in this case.
Security proof for the FO protocol. With similar techniques as in [4], we can
prove the strSimTF security with a pe value matching the necessary condition
which was identied above.
Theorem 8 (TF-Resistance of the FO protocol). For pe = B(e; e n+; 12 )
for every e, the FO scheme is strSimTF-secure.
Proof. In the experiment, we let A denote all participants close to V (by de-
nition, they are all malicious) and P  denote all far-away participants. We let
Viewi be the view of A just before receiving the challenge ci and View be the
nal view. If View includes b = 1, it is clear that it leaks some I which is enough
for a simulator S to pass the protocol with exactly the same probability. So, we
only have to focus on the b = 0 case in the terrorist fraud.
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We let wi be the extra information (obtained from P
), not contained in
Viewi, which is received by A before it is critical to answer ri, and we denote
ri = A(Viewi; ci; wi). If A takes too long time, the answer ri is unimportant
and we denote ri = ?. Note that wi is still dened as the information before
it is critical to answer in this case. I.e., there is no time to have a round trip
between A and P  from the time A receives ci to the time we set wi. Due to the
assumptions on tainted sessions and that ci is randomly selected by V , we note
that (Viewi; wi) is independent from ci. We dene a vector y
0 by
y0i = A(Viewi; 1; wi)A(Viewi; 2; wi)
We consider a simulator S computing y0 and using it with b = 1 to pass the
protocol. We want to show that pS  pA. Let e = dH(y; y0). Clearly, what we
have to prove is that E(pe)  pA.
We let Ci be the set of all c's such that A(Viewi; c; wi) = ac;i with a computed
from V . I.e., Ci is the set of challenges to which A answers correctly in round i.
We let S be the set of all i such that ci 2 Ci. I.e., A answers correctly in round
i. Clearly, pA = Pr[#S   ].
We let R be the set of all i's such that Ci has cardinality 2, i.e., A always
answers correctly. Clearly, for i 2 R, we have
y0i = A(Viewi; 1; wi)A(Viewi; 2; wi) = a1;i  a2;i = yi
Since pe is decreasing, we have pe  pn #R. Now, we want to prove that
E(pn #R)  pA.
For every possible set R, we have Pr[#S   jR]  B(n #R;   #R; 12 ) =
pn #R. By averaging over R, we obtain E(pn #R)  pA. ut
3 The Boureanu-Mitrokotsa-Vaudenay Approach
3.1 A Two-Dimensional Notion
In [3], Boureanu et al. proposed another denition of terrorist fraud security
which is sketched as follows:
Denition 9 ((; 0)-resistance to TF [3]). We say that a DB protocol is
(; 0)-resistant to terrorist-fraud if for any far-away, coerced prover P , it is
the case that, below, (1) implies (2)
| (1): an adversary A interfering up to his powers with an interaction between
P  and verier V on their shared secret, where this interaction is successful with
probability at least  (over the random choices of V and A),
| (2): A can later succeed on his own to make the verier accept in a new
protocol run with a probability greater than 0 (taken over the new random choices
made by V and A).
It is further said that this easily extends in a multiparty setting.
Interestingly, this denition separates the probability of success  of the
terrorist fraud and the one 0 of the further impersonation. This avoids having
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to consider a hard-to-dene notion of optimal probability of success of an attack
which cannot be asymptotic (see remark 4) but makes security be based on two
dimensions ( and 0) instead of one.
3.2 Collusion Fraud
In [5], Boureanu et al. proposed to replace this denition by the notion of collu-
sion fraud :
\A far-away prover holding x helps an adversary to make the verier
accept the proof. This might be in the presence of many other hon-
est participants. However, there should be no man-in-the-middle attack
constructed based on this malicious prover. I.e., the adversary should
not extract from him any advantage to run (later) a man-in-the-middle
attack."
which is further formulated in Vaudenay's FSE 2013 invited talk5 as
\P (x) far from all V (x)'s interacts with A and makes one V (x) accept,
but View(A) does not give any advantage to mount a man-in-the-middle
attack"
This resembles the GameTF notion where the nal view of the adversary is
provided in a further maa fraud adversary. This notion is further made more
precise in [4]:
Denition 10 ((; 0)-resistance to collusion-fraud [4]).
(8s)(8P ) (8locV0 such that d(locV0 ; locP) > B) (8ACF ppt.) such that
Pr

OutV0 = 1 :
(x; y) Gen(1s)
P (x) ! ACF  ! V0(y)

 
over all random coins, there exists a (kind of) MiM attackm; `; z;A1;A2; Pi; Pj ; Vi0
using P and P  in the learning phase, such that
Pr
24OutV = 1 : (x; y) Gen(1s)P ()1 (x); : : : ; P ()m (x) ! A1  ! V1(y); : : : ; Vz(y)
Pm+1(x); : : : ; P`(x) ! A2(V iewA1) ! V (y)
35  0
where P  is any (unbounded) dishonest prover and P () runs either P or P .
Following the MiM requirements, d(locPj ; locV ) > B, for all j 2 fm+1; `g. In a
concurrent setting, we implicitly allow a polynomially bounded number of P (x0),
P (x0), and V (y0) with independent (x0; y0), but no honest participant close to
V0.
6
5 http://fse2013.spms.ntu.edu.sg/slides/Slides02.pdf
6 \ppt." means \probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm".
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Essentially, it allows the collusion fraud to be run several times until the adver-
sary can extract enough information to mount an attack. In the denition, we
assume that every running algorithms M are given a location which is denoted
by locM . The value B is the maximal distance until which the prover is consid-
ered too far from the verier. The man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack separates a
learning phase with m provers and z veriers, from an attack phase with ` m
far-away provers and one verier. The learning phase can run with either the
honest prover or the malicious one P  which is being considered in the collusion
fraud. The above theorem refers to a kind of MiM since it is assumed that the
man-in-the-middle plays also with P , which is not the case in regular MiM
attacks.
Clearly, this captures the scenario used in GameTF security.
3.3 SKI: A Collusion-Fraud Resistant Protocol
Boureanu et al. [3,4,5] further proposed the SKI distance-bounding protocols
which provide security against collusion fraud. Compared to the protocols in
the Swiss-Knife family, these protocols do not have a post-authentication phase,
but require a larger set of challenges (namely, 3 instead of 2). (See Fig. 6.) The
second secret y is further derived from the rst one x by using a leakage scheme
L. Essentially, running a collusion fraud is bound to leak y which, based being
run several times, allows to fully reconstruct x.
Verier Prover
secret: x secret: x
initialization phase
NP            pick NP
pick a; L; NV
M;L;NV          !
M = a fx(NP ; NV ; L) a = M  fx(NP ; NV ; L)
y = L(x) y = L(x)
distance bounding phase
for i = 1 to n
pick ci 2 f1; 2; 3g
start timeri
ci          !
stop timeri
ri            ri =
8<:
a1;i if ci = 1
a2;i if ci = 2
yi  a1;i  a2;i if ci = 3
#fi : ri and timeri correctg   OutV          !
Fig. 6. The SKI Distance-Bounding Protocol [3,4]
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The SKI security requires n     n6 , which imposes some restriction on
the noise probability. Another disadvantage is that we need a stronger notion of
PRF: a circular-keying secure PRF. The security of SKI is stated as follows.
Theorem 11 (Boureanu-Mitrokotsa-Vaudenay [4]). If f is a ("; T )-circular-
keying secure PRF and the verier requires at least  correct rounds,
{ all distance frauds (with complexity bounded by T ) have a success probability
bounded by Pr[success]  B(n; ; 34 ) + ";
{ all man-in-the-middle attacks (with complexity bounded by T ) have a success
probability bounded by Pr[success]  B(n; ; 23 ) + r
2
2 2
 k + ", where k is the
nonce length and r is the number of participants in the experiment;
{ for all collusion frauds such that p = Pr[CF succeeds]  B(n2 ;    n2 ; 23 )1 c
and p 1 polynomially bounded, there is an associated man-in-the-middle at-
tack with P  such that Pr[MiM succeeds]   1 B(n2 ;    n2 ; 23 )cs, for any
c.
B is dened by Eq.(1). On Fig. 5 we plot   log2B(n; ; p) for p 2 f 23 ; 34g and  log2B(n2 ;    n2 ; 23 ) for  = dn  0:9e. Due to Lem. 1, it is clear that the rst
two curves are close to a line with slope
( n p)2
2p(1 p) . By applying Lem. 1 with n and
t replaced by n2 and 2t 1, we obtain that the slope of the third one is
(2 n 1 p)2
2p(1 p)
with p = 23 . To reach a security of 2
 80 for distance fraud, we need a pretty high
n = 724. For man-in-the-middle, n = 353 is enough. For collusion fraud, we still
need a very high n = 2388, but this has no inuence on the security against
man-in-the-middle. If a security of 2 20 is considered as enough, we need n = 76
for man-in-the-middle, n = 163 for distance fraud, or n = 531 for collusion fraud.
(Of course, gures become better with a larger =n ratio.)
Compared to the FO protocol, every distance fraud attacks is limited to a
success probability of B(n; ; 34 ). Furthermore, there is no auxiliary input such as
some y0 vector to ease a maa fraud. All man-in-the-middle attacks are limited
to a success probability of B(n; ; 23 ).
3.4 Soundness
The idea behind SKI is that the secret is extractable from the collusion. Ex-
tractability may not always be necessary to protect against terrorist fraud but
it looks like a convenient and easy-to-deal-with notion. As a matter of fact,
Boureanu et al. [5] mentions that collusion resistance looks like some notion of
soundness in interactive proofs.
Indeed, a distance-bounding protocol is an interactive proof for holding a
secret (this is the authentication part) and of close distance. An associated notion
of soundness for this proof could be formalized by means of an extractor. We
propose the following denition:
Denition 12 (-m-soundness). We say that a distance-bounding protocol is
-sound if for all experiment exp(V; ID) such that
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{ all provers and veriers work for the same identity ID,
{ there is no close prover,
{ there is no close verier,
{ V accepts with probability at least ,
there exists a ppt algorithm E called extractor, such that by running m times
exp(V; ID) in some executions expi(V; ID), i = 1; : : : ;m, if Viewi denotes the view
of all close participants in expi(V; ID) and Succi is the event that V accepts in
this experiment, we have
Pr [E(View1; : : : ;Viewm) = xIDjSucc1; : : : ;Succm] = 1  negl(n)
Lemma 13 (Link between soundness and collusion frauds). For any p 
 such that p 1 is polynomially bounded, if the protocol is -m-sound, then it
(p; 1  negl(n))-resists to collusion fraud (in the sense of Def.10).
Proof. Given a collusion fraud with a malicious prover P (xID) succeeding with
probability p  , we have an experiment Exp satisfying the properties of the
denition of -m-soundness. Thus, there must exist some extractor E . This de-
nes a learning phase of a man-in-the-middle attack involving P (xID), which
just simulates, for 
(mp 1) times the experiment so that at least m simulations
succeed with probability 1  negl(n). At the end of this learning phase, A com-
putes xID by using E . Then, we dene an attack phase with an adversary alone
with V (yID), receiving the x computed by A. This attack succeeds with proba-
bility 1  negl(n). So, the protocol (p; 1  negl(n))-resists to collusion fraud. ut
With the new soundness denition, we can prove the following result.
Theorem 14 (Soundness of the SKI protocol). For any n >
5
6 and  such
that  1B(n2 ;    n2 ; 23 ) = negl(n), the SKI scheme is -s-sound.
We cannot prove the soundness of the FO protocol (since the x part of the secret
never leaks).
Proof. Again, we use techniques from [5]. The proof is similar to the one of Th. 8.
With the same notations, R now denotes the set of i's such that the cardinality
of Ci is 3, and we dene
y0i = A(Viewi; 1; wi)A(Viewi; 2; wi)A(Viewi; 3; wi)
For i 2 R, we have y0i =   x. So, we are interested in the majority of the y0i's.
Again, we have Pr[#S   jR]  B(n #R;   #R; 23 ). For #R  n2 , we have
Pr[#S   jR]  B(n #R;   #R; 23 )  B(n2 ;    n2 ; 23 ). By averaging over all
R's such that #R  n2 , we obtain Pr[#S  ;#R  n2 ]  B(n2 ;    n2 ; 23 ) from
which we deduce Pr[#R  n2 j#S   ]   1B(n2 ;   n2 ; 23 ). So, with probability
larger than 1   1B(n2 ;    n2 ; 23 ), the majority of the y0i's equals   x. After s
such attempts, we recover s linear bits of x, so we extract x. ut
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4 Conclusion
We have identied some mistakes in [12]: The security result about the MSK
protocol is incorrect, as well as the original probabilities specied in the FO
protocol.
We have compared two notions of terrorist fraud resistance: SimTF and col-
lusion fraud resistance. We have also compared the two protocols oering these
resistance: FO and SKI, respectively. The advantages of FO are that
{ it uses binary challenges;
{ it is resilient to noise at a higher level 14 ;
{ it relies on standard PRF security.
The drawbacks are that
{ it includes a weird code, not supposed to be used;
{ its resistance to maa fraud is lowered to B(n; ; 34 ) due to the (too) strong
requirements of SimTF security;
{ it has a non uniform security B(w;    n+ w; 12 ) for distance fraud.
About the prominent proposal for the SKI protocol, the advantages are that
{ it has a uniform security of B(n; ; 34 ) for distance fraud;
{ it has a better security B(n; ; 23 ) against man-in-the-middle;
{ all elements of the protocol are used.
The drawbacks are that
{ it uses non-binary challenges;
{ it is only resilient to noise at a level of 16 ;
{ it relies on non-standard PRF security.
Clearly, designing a protocol oering all these types of resistance, still with
reasonable parameters in practice, remains an important challenge.
Finally, we extended the collusion fraud resistance by the notion of soundness.
This notion justies itself by comparison to interactive proofs of knowledge based
on an extractor.
We believe that an ideal protocol could combine both approaches of the FO
and SKI protocols: to provide better security parameters, we should adopt the
leakage scheme approach of SKI (at the cost of a non-standard PRF assumption)
instead of the escape protocol with b = 1 (which lowers security) and adopt, like
FO, the Swiss-Knife frame with only two possible challenges instead of three.
It would provide uniform security for distance fraud and be resilient to noise
up to a 14 ratio. The only remaining drawback would be the non-standard PRF
assumption. Designing such a provably secure protocol remains an open problem.
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